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Economic evaluation of projects involving changes in mortality risks conventionally assumes 
that lives are statistical, i.e., that risks and policy-induced changes in risk are small and similar 
among a population of anonymous individuals. In reality, baseline mortality risks and policy-
induced changes in risk often differ among individuals. We examine the effects of 
information about heterogeneity of risk on economic evaluation. Although social welfare, 
defined by aggregate expected utility, is unaffected by information about risk heterogeneity, 
the outcome of benefit-cost analysis (BCA), i.e., the unweighted sum of individual 
compensating or equivalent variations, is sensitive to this information. The effect of 
information on the outcome of BCA depends on i) whether information is about heterogeneity 
of the baseline and/or change in risk, ii) whether risk is valued using willingness to pay 
(WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA), iii) the status quo policy, and iv) whether individuals 
are risk-averse or risk-neutral in wealth. We show that BCA does not justify a systematic bias 
in favor of identified lives in the allocation of safety expenditures and suggest some political 
factors that may explain this bias. 
 1. Introduction 
Societies spend large quantities of resources to help identified victims (Lamm, 2001; 
Richardson and McKie, 2003). But spending large amounts to benefit only a few may be 
inefficient. Moreover, the question arises why some people receive particular attention and 
not others. The special concern toward identified lives can drive important priorities in risk 
management, like the choice between prevention and mitigation policies (Corso et al., 2002). 
More generally, information about whom a policy benefits may have an effect on the chances 
that the policy will be adopted. This effect is potentially important for benefit-cost analysis 
(BCA) of health and safety policies and for the study of the valuation of health and mortality 
risk.  
The economic literature on the value of life has, from the beginning, clearly distinguished 
between identified and statistical lives. In the first paragraph of his seminal paper, Schelling 
(1968) writes “It is not the worth of human life that I shall discuss, but of ‘life-saving,’ of 
preventing death. And it is not a particular death, but a statistical death.” Economists have 
since been very cautious to be clear that the standard valuation approach – purposely labeled 
the “value-of-statistical-life” (VSL) approach – applies only when changes in risk are small 
and similar among the affected population. As Viscusi (1992) states “This need to think in 
terms of statistical lives as opposed to certain lives defines the main character of our choice 
problem.” We see at least two advantages of this approach. First, the focus on statistical rather 
than identified lives is consistent with the traditional marginal approach to the valuation of 
public goods (Samuelson, 1954, Bergstrom, 1982). Second, it lessens the scope for ethical and 
psychological concerns (Schelling, 1968).  
But this focus on statistical lives leaves open the question of how to evaluate a project that 
may save, or may threaten, the lives of a few identified people. One may judge that the VSL 
approach is inappropriate because lives are not “statistical enough.” But what should one do 
instead? Scholars have clearly recognized that identified and statistical lives are not the same 
(Schelling, 1968, Weinstein et al., 1980, Keeney, 1995, and especially Pratt and Zeckhauser, 
1996),
1 but how this affects the application of BCA is less clear.  
The distinction between identified and statistical lives is not sharp, but a continuum 
characterized by available information about heterogeneity of risk. People are neither 
identical nor anonymous, and neither baseline risks nor policy-induced changes in risk are 
always small or identical across people. In general, both baseline risks and risk changes differ 
among individuals because of differences in exposure to factors presenting the risk (e.g., 
sources of pollution, traffic conditions) and differences in susceptibility (e.g., related to age, 
sex, health status, genetics, behavior). In practice, however, information about how risks and 
policy-induced changes in risk differ among individuals is often so limited that one has little 
choice but to treat the risks as similar. Individuals may be conceived as facing a compound 
lottery. In the first stage, their initial risk and policy-induced risk change are drawn from the 
population distribution, and in the second stage the outcome of the risk is realized. Before 
information about the outcome of the first stage is available, risks are identical across 
individuals. 
                                                 
1 In particular, Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996) adjust for the effects of heterogeneity of wealth and risk by 
examining optimal safety expenditures behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance where individuals have no 
information about their own wealth and risk exposure. 
  1The main objective of this paper is to examine how information about heterogeneity of risk 
and of policy-induced changes in risk influences economic valuation and hence the outcome 
of BCA. Specifically, we investigate how the results of BCA depend on information about 
individual risks and risk changes. We compare these results with maximization of aggregate 
expected utility, an objective which is independent of information about risk heterogeneity 
when, as in our analysis, people are otherwise identical. We find that the effects of 
information about risk heterogeneity on the outcome of BCA depend on several factors, 
including whether the information concerns the baseline and/or change in risk and whether 
willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA) measures are used. In addition, we 
find that BCA does not provide systematic support for giving greater priority to identified 
than to statistical lives. 
Our analysis meets a well-known conceptual issue, “Broome’s paradox.”
2 This paradox may 
be presented as follows.
 Consider a project that is anticipated to kill one person from a 
population of similar individuals (e.g., the project may put construction workers at risk). It 
may be that if the identity of the one who would die was unknown, the project would pass a 
net-benefit test and be adopted. Yet, if this person’s identity was known he might require 
infinite compensation for the loss of his life and the project would fail the net-benefit test and 
be rejected. This is a paradox in the sense that the only difference between the two situations 
is knowing the identity of the person who will die, and this it may be argued (Broome, 1978; 
Heinzerling, 2000) should not ultimately affect the social decision rule.
3 Broome’s paradox is 
a useful starting point for our analysis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple example 
based on Broome’s paradox which highlights the effect of information about heterogeneity of 
policy-induced changes in mortality risk on BCA. In Section 3, we review the standard model 
of value per statistical life. Using that model, we examine in Section 4 how information about 
heterogeneity of policy-induced changes in mortality risk affects each of the four measures of 
economic valuation: compensating and equivalent variations for reductions and increases in 
mortality risk. In Section 5, we examine the effects of information about heterogeneity in 
baseline risk. We show in Section 6 that altruism (concern for others’ well-being) does not in 
general justify the special concern with identified lives. In Section 7, we conclude with a 
discussion of policy implications and of other factors that may help to explain the special 
concern with identified lives. 
2. A Paradox of Benefit-Cost Analysis? 
Consider an economy with two people, H and L. Each has initial wealth   and probability  w p  
of surviving the single period we consider. Each is risk-neutral in wealth and has no bequest 
motive. Consequently, each individual has expected utility (EU)  
                                                 
2 Broome’s (1978) provocative paper raises a number of issues for BCA. Many of these issues are addressed in a 
set of critical papers (Buchanan and Faith, 1979; Jones-Lee, 1979; Williams, 1979). On the issue of interest to 
this paper, Ulph (1982) suggests that Broome’s paradox arises due to an inappropriate social welfare function, 
i.e., a utilitarian framework. Our discussion differs since we work within a utilitarian framework.  
3 Broome (1978) presents another version of the paradox that we sum up as follows: Suppose information about 
who will die is not available today, but will be available tomorrow. If the project is up for consideration today, it 
may be acceptable, but tomorrow it will be deemed unacceptable by an infinite margin. Thus re-evaluating the 
project one day later would lead to rejecting it as “infinitely wrong.” See also Heinzerling (2000) who argues 
that the evaluation of projects that affect mortality risks should not depend on whether the lives at risk are 
identifiable.  
  2EU = pw.          ( 1 )  
Consider a project that will impose mortality risk on both people. The average incremental 
mortality risk is  . The benefit of the project to each person is  .  e s
If people do not know their individual incremental risks (or if the incremental risks are 
identical), then each has expected utility 
EU/no info  () () p ews =− + .        ( 2 )  
Defining social welfare as the sum of the two individuals’ expected utilities, average social 
welfare is as given by eqn. (2). Moreover, if the two individuals face different incremental 
risks but the total risk in the economy is fixed (i.e., the expected number of lives lost is fixed), 
then eqn. (2) also describes per-capita social welfare. 
Now consider the effect of information about individual risks. For simplicity, assume H (high) 
faces incremental risk 2e and L (low) faces no incremental risk. Average social welfare given 
information is 
EU/info = 0.5( 2 )( ) 0.5 ( ) ( )( ) p ews p ws pews −+ + + = −+ .  (3) 
Social welfare with information is the same as in the no-information case. In this example, 
information about individual changes in risk does not affect social welfare, as Broome (1978) 
suggests. Moreover, observe that the project will enhance social welfare if and only if 
() () p ews p w −+ > .         ( 4 )  
Now examine how BCA would handle the situation. BCA involves comparing the monetary-
equivalent values of social benefits and costs. The per-capita benefit is  . The costs are the 
total compensation required to induce the people to accept the mortality risks. The 
compensating variation to accept a risk
s
x, Cx, is defined by  ()
[ ] () ( ) pxwC x p w −+ =        ( 5 )  
which implies 
() / ( ) Cx x w p x =− .         ( 6 )  
In the case without information about individual risks, the per-capita cost is 
C/no info =  .        ( 7 )   /( ) ew p e −
With information about individual risks, the per-capita cost is 
C/info = 0.5 .     (8)  [2 /( 2 )] 0.5[0] /( 2 ) ew p e ew p e −+ = −
  3Since C/info > C/no info, the decision recommended by BCA may depend on whether or not 
the individual risks are known.
4 Specifically, if 
C/no info < s < C/info, i.e.,  ,      (9)  /( ) /( 2 ) ew p e s ew p e −< < −
then BCA will suggest the project should proceed if there is no information about individual 
risks, but should be rejected if individual risks are known. 
Another approach to BCA is to ask if there is any lump-sum transfer   such that the project 
with transfer is Pareto superior to rejection of the project. In the present case with 
information, the question is whether there is an amount   that could be transferred from L to 
H such that H prefers to adopt the project, i.e., 
y
y
(2 ) ( ) p ews y p w −+ + > ,       ( 1 0 )  
and L prefers to adopt the project, i.e., 
() p wsy p w +− > .        ( 1 1 )  
Eqn. (11) implies that  , i.e., L cannot provide compensation greater than   if he is to 
prefer the project with transfer to its absence. So the maximum expected utility of H cannot 






p e −  can be arbitrarily close (or even equal) to zero, and so with finite 
 the inequality is violated.  s
Note that if one wants to maximize social welfare (SW) defined as the sum of the two 
individuals’ expected utilities, it is optimal to transfer all the benefits of the project to the 
person with higher survival probability. That is, the maximum of 
SW = (2 ) ( )( ) p ews y p ws y −+ + + + −      ( 1 2 )  
is obtained for  . Since there is assumed to be no bequest motive, any wealth given to a 
person who dies contributes no well-being to the society.
5 This shows that SW can be made 
higher under information about individual risks than under no information. In contrast, recall 




                                                
Why is it possible that the project increases social welfare with or without information about 
individual risk, but may not be even a potential Pareto improvement with information about 
individual risk? The BCA criterion aggregates welfare gains and losses across people in 
monetary terms. The relationship between survival probability and the monetary value of 
utility increments can be highly non-linear. In our example, as survival probability approaches 
 
4 Eqn. (7) makes clear that the compensation could be infinite for e , as Broome (1978) suggests. The 
example will show that this extreme case is not required to induce the type of paradox proposed by Broome. 
p =
5 Indeed, social welfare can be further increased by transferring not only the project benefits but all wealth from 
H (with smaller survival probability) to L (with larger survival probability). 
6 This example also suggests that information may have a negative value for the society. Suppose the condition 
in eqn. (9) holds. Then if society evaluates the project using BCA, information would lead it to reject the project. 
Without information, the project would be accepted and SW would increase.  
  4zero, the monetary value of a unit of utility approaches infinity. In contrast, the expected-
utility criterion adds increments of expected utility, which are linear in probability. Measuring 
in utility units, changes in individual risk (holding population risk constant) and information 
about individual risk have no effect on social welfare. Measuring in monetary units, 
information may have a large effect since the monetary value of the harm increases more 
rapidly for the person whose risk is increased than it decreases for the person whose risk is 
decreased (i.e., the indifference curve for wealth and risk and the compensation function for 
risk are both convex, as will be shown below). 
This example illustrates a well-known point: adding compensation is not the same as adding 
utility.
7 If one wants to use monetary compensation as a proxy for adding utility, one needs to 
adjust compensation for differences in the marginal utility of consumption between people. It 
is well-known that adding unweighted compensation is valid in a first-best economy in which 
a social planner is able to implement lump-sum transfers so as to equalize marginal utility of 
consumption across people (Samuelson, 1954). But it is also well-known that implementing 
optimal lump-sum transfers, or weighting compensation by the inverse of the marginal utility 
of consumption, confronts the problem of non-observability of utility, which BCA avoids by 
seeking to determine only whether a proposed change is a potential Pareto improvement (i.e., 
satisfies the Kaldor-Hicks compensation test).
8 
The logical point conveyed by the example is that without information individuals are 
identical and thus there is no need to weight their compensation for any difference in marginal 
utilities. In this case, the unweighted sum of compensation is a correct indicator of social 
welfare. This is not true with information about differences in individual risks. Indeed, 
information makes the situation asymmetrical and marginal utilities may differ between 
individuals. Consequently, whether lives are statistical or identified may matter for the 
outcome of BCA. In the remainder of the paper, we study the effects of individual-specific 
information about risks on the outcome of BCA, i.e., on the sum of unweighted individual 
compensation. 
3. The Value-of-Statistical-Life Model 
In this section, we present the standard one-period value-of-statistical-life (VSL) model. An 
individual maximizes a (state-dependent) expected indirect utility given by 
V= ( ) (1 ) ( ) puw pvw +−       ( 1 3 )  
where  p  is the probability of surviving the period, u  is the utility of wealth if he is 
survives, and v  is the utility of wealth if he dies (e.g., the utility of a bequest). This model 
was introduced by Drèze (1962) and Jones-Lee (1974) and has been commonly used in the 
VSL literature (e.g., Viscusi and Aldy, 2003).  
(.)
(.)
We adopt the standard assumptions that   and v are twice differentiable with  , 
,   and v . That is, state-dependent utilities are increasing and concave. 
At any wealth level, both utility and marginal utility are larger if alive than dead. Indifference 
u uv >
'' uv >≥ 0'' 0 u ≤ '' 0 ≤
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Blackorby and Donaldson (1990) and Johansson (1998). In the context of mortality risks, see, e.g., 
Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996) and Armantier and Treich (2004). 
8 Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996) propose adjusting empirical estimates of WTP for mortality risk reduction to 
account for differences in marginal utility of wealth associated with total mortality risk. 
  5curves over   are represented in Figure 1. Under our assumptions on u  and  , the 
indifference curves are decreasing and convex.  





VSL is the marginal rate of substitution between wealth and survival probability, i.e., (the 
negative of) the slope of the indifference curve at  . It is defined by  ( , ) wp
() ()
VSL 0
'( ) (1 ) '( )
dw u w v w




.      ( 1 4 )  
VSL may vary across individuals since it depends on  , w p  and on the shape of the utility 
function through u  and  . But notice that VSL is a marginal rate of substitution, and hence it 
does not capture any individual heterogeneity in the risk change. VSL provides a good 
approximation to an individual’s monetary compensation for a given change in risk only if the 
change   is small. At the population level, average VSL provides a good approximation to 
the social value of a change in population risk if all risk changes in the population are small. 
A formally equivalent situation is that of a few individuals facing a significant change in risk, 
but these individuals are anonymous within the population (to themselves and to others). Our 





The expression for VSL in eqn. (14) is useful for identifying two effects that will be important 
for our analysis. The first is the dead-anyway effect (Pratt and Zechauser, 1996). It states that 
VSL increases with the initial level of risk, i.e., decreases with survival probability  p  
( ). In Figure 1, this is equivalent to saying that the indifference curve is steeper 
at B than at A. The intuition is that an individual facing a large total probability of death has 
little incentive to limit his spending on risk reduction since he is less likely to survive and 
have other opportunities for consumption.
10 In eqn. (14), the value of the numerator is 
independent of 
VSL/ p ∂
 and a decrease in  p  reduces the value of the denominator (since u ). 
The second effect is the wealth effect. It states that VSL increases with initial wealth  , i.e., 
. This is equivalent to saying that the indifference curve is steeper at C than at 
A. The intuition for this effect is two-fold. First, wealthier people have more to loose if they 
die (i.e., the numerator in eqn. (14) increases with   because u ). Second, the utility cost 
of spending is smaller (or no larger) due to diminishing marginal utility (risk aversion) with 
respect to wealth (i.e., the denominator in eqn. (14) does not increase because u  and 
). These two effects imply that VSL increases as one moves upward and leftward 
along an indifference curve, and so the indifference curves are convex. In Figure 1, VSL at D 
is greater than VSL at A, because of both the dead-anyway and the wealth effects.  
'' v >
w
VSL/ w ∂ ∂
''(.) 0 v ≤
w ' v > '
                                                
'' 0
 
9 It is also important to acknowledge that identifiability may impair rational decision-making when the threat of 
death is present. This is recognized in the following paragraph from Schelling (1968): “The avoidance of a 
particular death – the death of a named individual– cannot be treated straightforwardly as a consumer choice. It 
involves anxiety and sentiment, guilt and awe, responsibility and religion. If the individuals are identified, there 
are many of us who cannot even answer whether one should die that two may live.” In the following, we will 
abstract from this problem that may play an important role for practical BCA, e.g. for the elicitation of individual 
WTP in surveys. Observe however that opposite arguments may be used with statistical lives due to the small 
probabilities involved, like the insensitivity to probabilities (Hammitt and Graham, 1999). 
10 For the same reason, he also has little incentive to limit his expenditures on other goods. 
  64. Information about Heterogeneous Changes in Risk  
The example in Section 2 showed that information concerning how changes in risk vary in the 
population can matter if the policy decision is based on BCA. The strength of this effect 
depends on the non-linearity of the compensation function, as given in eqn. (6) 
. The crucial property is the convexity of this function, which we now 
demonstrate.  
() / ( ) Cx x w p x =−
Consider two individual-specific risk increments,  1 x  and  2 x . In the absence of information 
about individual-specific risk, each individual faces an expected risk increment of 
1 0.5 0.5 2 x x =+ x  and requires compensation  () Cx (see Figure 2). Under perfect information, 
each knows his specific incremental risk and average compensation is  . 
Information increases average compensation iff 
12 0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( ) Cx Cx +
1 ( ) .5 ( ) Cx Cx + 2 ( ) Cx ≥ 0.5 0 , which is true 
when   is convex. It is easy to understand that convexity of the compensation function is 
a necessary and sufficient condition for information about individual-specific risks to increase 
average compensation for any distribution of individual-specific risks in the economy 
(holding average risk fixed). It is also obvious that convexity of the indifference curves over 
 implies that Cxis convex. 
( ) Cx
) (, wp ( )
Analyzing the convexity of   is equivalent to comparing the compensation required for 
successive risk increments. Compare the compensation required for an incremental risk 
increase of 
C
x to the compensation required for a second equal increment x once the first has 
been made. Convexity of the compensation function implies that compensation for the second 
increment must be larger than for the first. There are two differences in the compensation for 
the second unit compared with the first one: i) survival probability is lower,  p x −  compared 
with  p ; and ii) wealth is higher,   compared with  . The first difference increases 
compensation through the dead-anyway effect, and the second increases compensation 
through the wealth effect.  
() wC x + w
In the remainder of this section, we use the standard VSL model (13) to study how 
information affects both WTA and WTP. As we have just seen, this amounts to studying the 
convexity of the compensation functions for changes in risk. We will consider two different 
status quo or default cases: at the status quo the project is not implemented, and at the status 
quo the project is implemented. Hence four cases will be studied. We will see that the 
conclusions differ in each case.  
4.1 WTA for implementing a risk-increasing project 
Generalizing the introductory example, we first consider WTA for a risk-increasing project. 
Let   be the WTA (compensating variation) defined by  ( ) Cx
() ( ( ) ) ( 1 ) ( ( ) )( ) ( 1 ) ( ) p x u wC x px v wC x p u w p v w −+ + − ++=+ −    (15) 
with 0 x p ≤≤ . Differentiating with respect to x gives 
(( ) ) (( ) )
'( ) 0
( )' ( () ) ( 1 )' ( () )
uw Cx vw Cx
Cx




.    (16) 
  7Differentiating once again with respect to x gives, under our assumptions on u  and  , 
. As noted above, the convexity of C  is immediate from the convexity of the 
indifference curve. Indeed, we have 
v
'' 0 C >
[ ] 1 () 0 . 5 () ( ) Cx Cx Cx <+ 2
)
 (see Figure 3). Since WTA is 
convex in risk increments, it increases with information about individual risk changes. Note 
that both the dead-anyway effect and the wealth effect are positive in this case, as shown 
above.  
This case shows that information about individual risk changes increases the (monetary-
equivalent) cost of the risk-increasing project and induces a bias in favor of the status quo. 
With more information, a project that would have been accepted may be rejected, thus 
preventing an increase in mortality risks in the economy. This is the case illustrated by 
Broome’s (1978) paradox.  
4.2 WTP for implementing a risk-decreasing project 
Let   be the WTP (compensating variation) for implementing a risk-decreasing project 
defined by 
( ) Px
() (( ) ) ( 1 ) (( ) )( ) ( 1 ) ( p xuw Px p xvw Px p uw pvw +− + − − − =+ −    (17) 
with 01 x p ≤≤ − . Differentiating with respect to x gives 
( ( )) ( ( ))
'( ) 0
( )' ( () ) ( 1 )' ( () )
uw Px vw Px
Px
p xu w Px p xv w Px
−− −
=>
+−+ − − −
.    (18) 
Differentiating once again with respect to x gives, under our assumptions on u  and  , 
. Again, observe from Figure 3 that this result is immediate from the convexity of the 
indifference curve. Indeed, we have 
v
'' 0 P <
[ ] 1 () 0 . 5 () ( ) Px Px Px >+ 2 . As a result, WTP is concave 
in risk reductions and thus decreases with information about individual risk changes. Note 
that, in this case, both the dead-anyway effect and the wealth effect are negative.  
This case shows that more information decreases the (monetary-equivalent) benefit of the 
risk-decreasing project and, like the previous case, induces a bias in favor of the status quo. 
More information may lead to rejecting a project that would have been accepted, thus 
forgoing an opportunity to reduce mortality risks in the economy. 
4.3 WTA for not implementing a risk-decreasing project 
Let   be the WTA (equivalent variation) for forgoing a risk-decreasing project defined 
by 
( ) n Cx
( () ) ( 1 )( () ) ( )() ( 1 )() nn puw C x pvw C x p xuw p xvw ++ − += ++ − −  (19) 
with 01 x p ≤≤ − . Differentiating with respect to x gives 
() ()
'( ) 0









.      ( 2 0 )  
  8Differentiating once again with respect to x gives 
2 ( '( )) [ ''( ( )) (1 ) ''( ( ))]
''( )




Cx p u w C x p v w C x
Cx




n .    (21) 
Under our assumptions on u  and  ,  C . As a result, WTA is convex in risk reductions 
and thus increases with information. In Figure 3, 
v '' 0 n >
[ ] 1 () 0 . 5 () ( ) nn n Cx Cx <+ 2 Cx . Note that, in 
this case, the dead-anyway effect is negative and the wealth effect is positive, suggesting that 
the latter effect dominates. Note also that it is not possible a priori from Figure 3 to infer the 
sign of the second derivative of  .   n C
This case shows that more information increases the (monetary-equivalent) benefit of the risk-
decreasing project and induces a bias in favor of the status quo (implementing the project). In 
this case, more information may lead to adopting a project that would have been rejected, and 
thus to reducing mortality risks in the economy. 
4.4 WTP for not implementing a risk-increasing project 
Let   be the WTP (equivalent variation) to prevent implementing a risk-increasing 
project defined by 
( ) n Px
( () ) ( 1 )( () ) ( )() ( 1 )() nn puw P x pvw P x p xuw p xvw −+ − − = − + − +    (22) 
with 0 x p ≤≤ . Differentiating with respect to x gives 
() ()
'( ) 0









> .      ( 2 3 )  
Differentiating once again with respect to x gives 
2 ( '( )) [ ''( ( )) (1 ) ''( ( ))]
''( )




Px p uwP x p vwP x
Px




n .    (24) 
Under our assumptions on u  and  ,  . As a result, WTP is concave in risk increments 
and thus decreases with information. In Figure 3, 
v '' 0 n P <
[ ] 1 () 0 . 5 () ( ) nn n Px Px Px >+ 2 . Note that, in 
this case, the dead-anyway effect is positive and the wealth effect is negative, suggesting 
again that the wealth effect dominates. Note also that it is not possible a priori from Figure 3 
to infer the sign of the second derivative of  .  n P
This case shows that more information decreases the (monetary-equivalent) cost of the risk-
increasing project and induces a bias in favor of the status quo (implementing the policy). 
More information may lead to adopting a project that would have been rejected and thus 
increase mortality risks in the economy. 
  95. Information about Heterogeneous Baseline Risks 
In the preceding sections, the initial risk is common across individuals although the risk 
changes can differ. We now consider a variant in which individuals face different initial risks. 
This variant is similar to a problem first analyzed by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996).  
There are   risk-neutral people in the economy with initial wealth  . Among these   
people, only 
N w N
R N ≤  are at risk, and of these R  people   will die. None of the   
others will die. A reduction in 
dR ≤ NR −
R  may be interpreted as increasing individual-specific 
information, or as a change in the distribution of risk in the population.  
We return to the simplest possible assumptions, as in our initial example, i.e., uz  
andvz . Social welfare in this economy equals 
() z =
() 0 =
SW ( ) ( )
Rd
NR wR w Nd w
R
−
=− + =− .      ( 2 5 )  
Observe that SW is independent of R . Suppose that a risk-reducing project will save   lives 
 for a given per-capita cost  . The net effect of the project on social welfare is also 
independent of 
n
( nd ≤ ) F
R .  
Let us now look at how BCA would handle the situation. Let   be the WTP 
(compensating variation) for the project of each of the 
() PR






−= ,       ( 2 6 )  
which yields 






.        ( 2 7 )  
Both individual WTP   and total (monetary-equivalent) benefits  () PR () RPR are decreasing in 
R . The use of BCA thus does not yield the same outcome as that obtained from social 
welfare maximization. Specifically, information will affect the former outcome, not the latter.  
It is interesting to note the direction of the bias. Indeed, the monetary value of the benefit of 
the project is larger when the number of people who are identified as at risk is smaller, i.e., a 
“benefit-concentration” effect. Observe that that this result is opposite the one obtained in 
Section 4.2, where aggregate WTP decreases with information about individual risk 
reductions. Here information about which people face larger risk reductions increases 
aggregate WTP. Better information about individual-specific risks may lead to adopting a 
project that would otherwise be rejected, thus decreasing mortality risk in this economy. 
Alternatively, we can evaluate WTA (compensating variation) for a risk-increasing project. 
Suppose that a risk-increasing project will kill r  people in this economy   for some 
social benefit. Let CR be defined by  
( ) rRd ≤−
( )





+=         ( 2 8 )  
which gives 






.         ( 2 9 )  
Individual WTA denoted CR decreases with  () R , as does the total (monetary-equivalent) 
social cost  () RCR. In this case, better information as to which people face additional risk 
increases the aggregate WTA. Better information may lead to rejecting a project that would 
otherwise be accepted, preventing an increase in mortality risk, as in Broome’s (1978) 
paradox.  
To summarize, under risk neutrality with respect to wealth, more information about the 
concentration of risk and risk change can lead to lower mortality risks in the economy. This 
can occur through either of two pathways: adopting risk-reducing projects that would be 
rejected, and rejecting risk-increasing projects that would be adopted, with poorer information 
about the concentration of risks and benefits. 
What is the effect of a change in R  in a model with risk aversion? No general result can be 
obtained, as was first suggested by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996: 753). To see this, consider the 
following example. Take the utility function 
()  a n d   () 0 uz z vz ==         ( 3 0 )  
together with the following set of parameter values:  , d , and   1 w = 50 =
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     ( 3 1 )  
so that  ( ) RPR is increasing over   and decreasing over  . Consequently, 
information about how many people are at risk has an ambiguous effect on aggregate WTP.  
[50,60] R∈ 60 R >
The non-monotonicity of  ( ) RPR emphasizes the presence of two effects: when R  decreases 
fewer people will pay but each is willing to pay more. This example proves that is not 
possible a priori to determine which effect dominates under risk-averse preferences. 
This example suggests that the effect of information about the concentration of risk in an 
economy is less easy to sign than the effect of information about differences in risk changes 
from a common baseline analyzed in Section 4. This can be easily understood. In the case of 
information about which people are at risk, there are not one but two sources of individual-
specific risks: risk over the baseline probability and risk over the change in probability. In the 
cases we have considered, these risks are perfectly positively correlated in the sense that the 
individual risk reduction is proportional to the baseline risk. 
  11One might consider the simpler problem of analyzing only heterogenous baseline risks. 
Assume now that people have different survival probabilities  p  but the risk reduction is the 
same for everyone. We can show that information about baseline risks has an ambiguous 
effect in this case as well. Take the same risk-averse utility function as in (30). Then compute 
the WTP (now denoted  ) as in eqn. (17) to obtain   ( ) Pp










.        ( 3 2 )  
From Section 4.2 it is easy to understand that the convexity of   in  ( ) Pp p  determines the 
effect of information about baseline probability on aggregate WTP. Yet, from eqn. (32) the 
sign of this effect is ambiguous, as the sign of   depends on the sign of  ''( ) Pp /2 p x − . 
Consequently the effect of more information about heterogeneous baseline risk depends on 
the values of  p  and  . Again, it is easy to see that this ambiguity disappears under risk-
neutrality,
11 in the sense that more information about baseline probabilities always increases 
aggregate WTP and aggregate WTA for all values of 
w
p  and  .  w
In contrast to the effects of information about heterogeneity of risk reduction, analyzed in 
Section 4, this section shows that the effects of information about heterogeneity in baseline 
risk on the monetary-equivalent value of changes in risk are in general ambiguous. This 
ambiguity results when differences in risk changes are perfectly correlated with differences in 
baseline risk and also when the risk changes are common across individuals (equivalently, 
when there is no information about heterogeneity of risk changes). An exception occurs for 
the case of risk neutrality with respect to wealth, where, for all values of  p  and  , the effects 
of information about either risk concentration or heterogeneous baseline risks increases 
aggregate WTP for a risk-reducing program and aggregate WTA for a risk-increasing 
program. 
w
6. Altruism and the Identifiable Victim Effect 
In this section, we consider altruistic individuals. Altruism is an important and natural concern 
in the matter of saving lives. Moreover, it is widely believed that there is an “identifiable 
victim effect”: people are willing to pay more to save the lives of others when these lives are 
easily identifiable than when they are statistical (see, e.g., Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997; 
Heinzerling, 2000; Small and Loewenstein, 2003). Typically, there is an empathic response to 
rescuing well-identified people (or animals) in precarious circumstances.  
There is little hope of capturing all the channels underlying such empathic responses in a 
simple economic model (recall the quote from Schelling (1968) in footnote 9). In any case, 
our previous model did not have a chance to do this since there was no consideration of 
altruism.
12 In this section we consider altruistic preferences and examine the effect of 
information on the valuation of life. As usual, it is insightful to start with an example. 
                                                 
11 By risk-neutrality we mean   and   with  .  () uz z = () vz k z = [0,1[ k ∈
12 In model (13), a natural interpretation of the utility function v(.) is a bequest function. This may be viewed as a 
form of altruism, toward one’s children for instance. But this is not the form of altruism that is important here. 
We study altruistic motives for other people’s utility (not only one’s children’s), i.e., one’s preferences over 
other people’s mortality risks.  
  12Two identical risk-neutral individuals have survival probability  p  and initial wealth  . We 
distinguish between private (self-interested) and social (private plus altruistic) preferences. 
Each individual has private expected utility EU = 
w
pw. They care for each other’s well-being 
so that their respective social expected utilities V  may be written 
Vp w p α =+ w ,        ( 3 3 )  
where   is their (identical) degree of altruism. We assume the individuals are pure altruists, 
i.e., their concerns for other people respect, or are aligned with, the other people’s 
preferences.
13 A risk-reducing project that increases the survival probabilities of each person 
by a probability increment 
α
x is under evaluation.  
Private WTP for the project is equal to 
     .        ( 3 4 )   / ( Px wpx =+ )
It is easy to see that each person’s social WTP for an increase in his own and the other 
person’s survival probability is equal to ( , i.e., the sum of private WTP,  , plus the 
altruistic WTP,  . This latter term represents the WTP for the increase in the other person’s 
survival probability. Accounting for altruism augments the aggregate private WTP by the 
quantity 2 . This raises the question: To evaluate a project when preferences include 
altruism, should one sum private WTP or social (private plus altruistic) WTP? 
1 )P α + P
P α
P α
It is interesting to examine social welfare in this economy. Observe that without the project 
we have SW = 2(1 )pw α + . With the project, we have SW = 2(1 )( )( ) p xwc α ++−  where   
denotes the per-capita cost of the project. In comparing these expressions, the term (  
cancels and the result depends on whether 
c
1 ) α +
( )( ) p xwc +−  is larger than  pw. Hence the choice 
of whether to adopt the project does not depend on the degree of altruism, and is the same as 
the choice with selfish preferences. Why is that? 
The point is that (pure) altruistic motives may be ignored in BCA. The sum of private WTP is 
an adequate estimate of the monetary-equivalent benefits of the project in the sense that if this 
sum exceeds the sum of the private costs of the project, then the project is a potential Pareto 
improvement for altruistic people. This point was first stressed by Bergstrom (1982), 
elaborated by Jones-Lee (1992), and generalized by Bergstrom (2005). The argument is 
simple, although not trivial. A pure altruist benefits when the project reduces another person’s 
risk, but is harmed when the project imposes costs on the other person. The net effect of the 
project on altruistic WTP is of the same sign as the net effect of the project on the other 
person’s private WTP.  
An implication of this observation is that considerations of altruism do not in general affect 
the valuation of identified vs. statistical lives in BCA. This does not imply that the identifiable 
victim does not exist, only that altruism (specifically, pure or non-paternalistic altruism) does 
not explain the effect and may be ignored in BCA.  
                                                 
13 See Jones-Lee (1992) for an analysis of the implications of both pure (i.e., benevolent, non-paternalistic) and 
paternalistic altruism (e.g., safety-focused altruism) for the valuation of life. 
  137. Policy Implications 
A standard economic result is that public projects with positive expected value should be 
adopted (Arrow and Lind, 1970). This result assumes an economy with either complete 
markets or a large number of individuals who can share risks. In this economy, the sum of 
individual compensating variation for a project is consistent with the maximization of social 
welfare, with or without information on the distribution of the project’s effects across 
individuals. This is because complete markets or risk-sharing yield an efficient outcome in the 
sense that individuals can equate their marginal utilities. However, when risk-sharing 
opportunities are limited, the rule of acceptance for public projects is less clear and the 
adequacy of BCA as a method for identifying gains in social welfare is not guaranteed.  
An important case of limited risk-sharing is when a bad outcome decreases marginal utility, a 
property of the standard state-dependent model for valuing mortality risk described by eqn. 
(13). In that case, it may be that some individuals could never be compensated for their loss, 
as suggested by Broome’s paradox. As a result, marginal utilities may differ among people 
and BCA may not be a correct indicator of social welfare. Individual-specific information 
about mortality risks may matter for BCA. In particular, the results of a BCA may depend on 
whether lives are statistical or identified. We have studied some theoretical determinants of 
this difference. Let us sum up some results:  
1. The effects of information about interpersonal differences in the risk change due to a 
project depend on whether one evaluates a project using WTP or WTA measures.  
a. WTA, whether compensating variation for a risk increase (Section 4.1) or 
equivalent variation to forgo a risk decrease (Section 4.3), is larger with more 
information about heterogeneity of the risk change. As a result, information about 
how the project affects individuals’ risks may lead to rejecting a risk-increasing 
project that would have been accepted (as in Broome’s paradox) or accepting a risk-
decreasing project that would have been rejected with less information. In both 
cases, information about heterogeneity leads toward lower aggregate risk in the 
economy. 
b. WTP, whether compensating variation for a risk decrease (Section 4.2) or 
equivalent variation to prevent a risk increase (Section 4.4), is smaller with more 
information about heterogeneity of the risk change. As a result, information about 
how the project affects individuals’ risks may lead to rejecting a risk-decreasing 
project that would have been accepted and accepting a risk-increasing project that 
would have been rejected with less information. In both cases, information about 
heterogeneity leads toward higher aggregate risk in the economy. 
c. As a corollary, there is no necessary relationship between the extent to which risk 
changes are statistical or identifiable and the degree of protection endorsed by BCA.  
2. When baseline risks are heterogeneous, the effect of information on BCA is in general 
ambiguous (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1996). When individuals are risk neutral with respect 
to wealth, more information about baseline risk can lead to increases in both types of 
compensating variation, i.e., WTP for a risk-decreasing policy and WTA for a risk-
increasing policy, and can therefore lead to more protective decisions (i.e., those that 
yield smaller aggregate mortality risk in the economy). 
  143. Altruism does not in general explain the identifiable victim effect. This is a 
consequence of a more general result that (pure) altruism need not be considered in BCA 
(Bergstrom, 2005). 
It is interesting to compare BCA with cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). In CEA, changes in 
health risk are often evaluated by the expected change in quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) 
in the economy.
14 Evaluation of the effects of a program on mortality risk is unaffected by 
whether lives are statistical or identified, or by information about heterogeneity of risks or risk 
changes in the economy (holding constant population risk as measured by aggregate expected 
QALYs). This result is immediate since the expected change in QALYs is linear in the 
probabilities. Hence if individuals’ preferences for survival are consistent with QALYs, CEA 
may be consistent with social welfare maximization (Hammitt, 2002).
15 Interestingly, Hadorn 
(1996) reports that the impartiality of the QALY approach was contested in the famous 
Oregon priority-setting exercise. The approach was perceived as introducing an ordering that 
undermined treatments for people facing life-threatening conditions, thus violating a 
preference for giving priority to identified victims.
16  
Overall, neither BCA nor CEA provide general support for prioritizing identified over 
anonymous people in life-saving policies. To conclude, we discuss three political factors that 
may explain such a prioritization: responsibility, lobbying and demagogy.
17  
First, it is important to recognize that persons in charge of safety decisions may have, or feel, 
a responsibility to help identified people. In particular, there may be a legal responsibility.
18 
By definition, the death of an identified victim will be known and blame may be easily 
attributed to decision makers, whereas the deaths of anonymous individuals may go unnoticed 
and may be more difficult to attribute to particular decisions. Physicians and risk managers 
routinely set limits on the risks to which individuals may be exposed, often focusing on 
absolute risk levels (e.g., safety norms or standards). This practice may lead to diverting 
resources from protecting individuals with average exposure to those who are highly exposed 
and thus toward identifiable individuals. Notice that identification need not be restricted to 
those exposed to high risk. Suppose that a target group (e.g., a minority or low-income group) 
has been disadvantaged for reasons other than risk, such as poor education. Providing this 
group with more protective risk regulations is a way to compensate them for their 
disadvantaged status.
19 Decision-makers may believe they have a duty to help such identified 
                                                 
14 A QALY represents a year of life adjusted by an index of quality of life or health (e.g., Gold et al., 1996; 
Hammitt, 2002). Simpler forms of CEA evaluate changes in mortality risk by the expected number of lives or 
life years saved. 
15 Empirical evidence suggests that QALYs are not consistent with individual preferences. See, e.g., Pliskin et al. 
(1980), McNeil et al. (1981), and Bleichrodt and Johannesson (1994). 
16 Richardson and McKie (2003) give as an example that “dental caps for pulp or near pulp exposure were 
assigned a higher priority than surgical treatment for ectopic pregnancy.” Miller et al. (2006) evaluate the 
implications of QALYs for allocating risk reduction in a population.  
17 Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show that individual-specific uncertainty may change the identity of the median 
voter, and hence the projects that will be selected by majority vote. We do not address how this effect might be 
influenced by information about heterogeneity of risk. 
18 Richardson and McKie (2003), quoting Fried (1969, p. 1418), indicate that the director of a mining company 
refusing to spend money to save a trapped man may be civilly and criminally liable, even though she has 
invested large sums of money to prevent such a catastrophe. Similar legal responsibilities may exist in hospitals, 
e.g., to care for terminally ill patients. 
19 This practice is discussed by Viscusi (2000). Notice that the standard model of public provision of safety 
based on Samuelson (1954) actually predicts quite an opposite result (Bergstrom, 1982). According to this 
model, it is optimal to devote more resources to prevent risks faced by the sub-population of, say, richer people. 
  15groups. Empathy and vividness may also contribute. Decision-makers may be more willing to 
endorse humane and caring policies, for both personal and political reasons. In contrast, they 
may be less willing to adopt policies that are perceived as unfair or unethical toward particular 
groups. This behavior is consistent with the concept of environmental justice (Tietenberg, 
1996). 
Second, one may view the society as composed of different groups of people, or lobbies, 
sharing common interests. Participants in small lobbies may have more intense interests and 
free-riding may be less pronounced. As a result, they may have disproportionate political 
influence (Olson, 1971). A policy that favors concentrated interests may be more likely to be 
adopted than a policy that profits the mass but has a negative impact on a few people. 
Moreover, consider a group that is particularly visible, e.g., through media exposure. This 
visibility may constitute a threat to a politician, or a firm, with reputational concerns. 
Visibility of a group may also be used to inform, or to manipulate, the public. This practice 
may exert an indirect pressure on decision-makers through the ensuing changes in public 
beliefs (Kuran and Sunstein, 1999). 
The last remark leads us to a third political factor that we may want to consider separately, 
demagogy of politicians. Politicians might adopt policies that the public believes are good 
even when those policies are not necessarily good for the public. The hypothesis is that 
policies that reduce risks to identified people are more likely to be perceived as beneficial by 
the public than those that reduce risks to statistical lives. There may be some justification for 
this hypothesis. Altruistic individuals may feel more compassion toward identified than 
toward statistical victims. This may in turn stimulate a stronger emotional response through 
an identifiable victim effect (Jenni and Lowenstein, 1997). Moreover, the observation of 
identified victims of a particular risk may make that risk more salient and increase concern 
about one’s own exposure to it. By the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), 
this may increase one’s perceived probability of exposure and induce a higher demand for 
mitigation (Sunstein, 2005). This aspect may be aggravated because individuals often 
misperceive the (marginal) costs of government services, and the way they think about how 
governments should allocate resources likely depends on ethical heuristics like the principle 
of equality (Kemp, 2003). 
Overall, benefit-cost analysis using the standard value-per-statistical-life approach to valuing 
changes in mortality risk may not yield the same results as maximization of social welfare, 
defined as the aggregation of individual expected utilities. In particular, whereas social 
welfare may be unaffected by information about heterogeneity of baseline risk and the 
magnitudes of policy-induced changes in risk, monetary-equivalent measures of the risk 
change depend on baseline risk and risk change and so the value of a policy-induced risk 
change may depend on information about risk heterogeneity. In contrast, the results of a cost-
effectiveness analysis, which quantifies the effects of changes in mortality risk using quality-
adjusted life years, lives saved, or other metrics, may be unaffected by information about risk 
heterogeneity. Hence if the effectiveness measure used in CEA is consistent with individuals’ 
preferences, the results of the analysis may be consistent with social-welfare maximization.
20 
A systematic premium for identified lives is not consistent with either BCA or CEA, but may 
                                                                                                                                                          
Such a practice is efficient since it rests on the assumption that the government is also able to implement lump-
sum transfers to redistribute income and finance the safety provision across the population. In other words, richer 
people will be at the same time taxed more heavily to compensate poorer people so that, at the optimum, 
marginal utilities are equal. 
20 Note, however, that it seems unlikely that QALYs are consistent with individual preferences (Hammitt, 2002). 
  16be explained by political and other factors. Whether disproportionate allocation of resources 
toward programs that save identified lives is socially desirable depends in part on the moral 
legitimacy of these political factors and on the magnitudes of the efficiency costs and 
distributional benefits. 
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Figure 1: Indifference curves, VSL, the dead-anyway and the wealth effect. 
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Figure 2: Individual-specific information about risk change increases the average WTA. 
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